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Naturalizing, Normativity, and
Using What “We” Know in Ethics
Margaret Urban Walker
Department of Philosophy, Fordham University
Bronx, NY

The provenance of “naturalized epistemology,” so-called, is too
recent for the hand of Quine not to be still heavily upon it. But like its
older relative, “naturalism,” it is an idea rich enough to be coveted,
and protean enough to be claimed, by diverse comers with different
things in mind. While Quine’s version of naturalized epistemology of
science inevitably furnishes the backdrop for current discussion of
naturalizing moral epistemology, it is important to pause over what
“naturalized epistemology” can and should mean in ethics. To what
extent is Quine’s example of an epistemology of science that helps
itself to science the model for understanding knowledge of and in
morality? Does it require a view of moral knowledge as reducible to, or
in a fundamental way furnished by, science? Or a view of moral theory
as science-like in some way? I argue that the appropriate analogy is
instead a holistic and reflexive epistemology of morality that helps
itself to moral judgments and standards seen as answerable to the
experience of the kinds of shared lives they make possible and
necessary. This approach neither privileges nor rejects wholesale what
scientific inquiries might have to say. In the spirit of naturalized
epistemology, it holds the importance of science to moral
understanding subject to what else we think we know, including what
we know morally.
My aim is to show that there are choices here that are deeply
enmeshed in views about science, knowledge, and morality. I take
morality, and hence the object of moral theorizing and moral
epistemology, to be real-time, culturally embedded practices of
responsibility. I see moral philosophy as a reflective but (for that
reason) empirically burdened theoretical practice that is epistemically
reflexive and normatively critical.1 There is no question here of trying
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to defend the view as a whole; instead I want to illustrate how it
exemplifies some features of a naturalized conception, with the effect
of steering attention in directions that moral philosophers have been
slow to go, and perhaps resistant to going.
My specific, interested, and constructive appropriation of
naturalized epistemology is as loaded as anyone else’s is going to be.
But this is only “natural,” in the relevant epistemological sense: there
is no epistemic position outside (a great deal of ) our knowledge. But
where - that is, on what knowledge - we stand as we seek new
understanding or revisions in the understanding we possess, and what
some of “us” think of as “our” knowledge, is a question that must be
opened. I am going to suggest our response to it should be morally
and politically self-conscious, as well as epistemologically
“freewheeling”

How Quine “Naturalized Epistemology
In “Epistemology Naturalized,” Quine argued that, with the
failure of reduction programs that promised firm foundations for
mathematical and scientific knowledge, science might just as well
explain itself.2 “Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into
place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (EN
82), whose job is to study the actual construction of a picture of the
world from scant sensory inputs. Quine is unconcerned about the
circularity of using empirical science to validate empirical science,
since there is no alternative knowledge of our knowledge. “We are
after an understanding of science as an institution or process in the
world, and we do not intend that understanding to be any better than
the science which is its object” (EN, 84).
This move immediately and persistently raised the question
whether Quine’s naturalized epistemology recaptured the normative
mission of traditional epistemology to explain what constitutes
adequate justification and real knowledge. The role of norms in
scientific knowledge in Quine’s naturalized epistemology is debatable.3
Quine’s view seems to be that the cognitive equipments of human
creatures disciplined by “pragmatic” inclinations, like conservatism in
theory change, simplicity of laws, and of course the ultimate
“empiricist discipline” of predictive success, are quite good enough.
Our inquiry into “how it is done” in science will reveal what it is like for
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it to be done well, for science is our best case of natural knowledge.
Its practice embodies what is to be done, as well as what is done, in
this pursuit.
In the conclusion of another essay from the same period,
Quine’s triumphal teleology of natural science emerges unabashed. As
he has it there, in the passage from reliance on our innate similarity
sense, through intuitive understandings of similarity, and then to the
scientific definition of theoretical kinds with explanatory significance,
which need not owe anything to the innate similarity sense, “the
animal vestige is wholly absorbed in the theory” providing us a
“paradigm of the evolution of unreason into science.” It is also an
example of natural knowledge that spurs further knowledge which in
turn rejects or corrects the original knowledge, or puts it into its newly
discovered place. Yet this looping process by which what we (think we)
know is corrected as we go farther on its very basis, has for Quine a
direction. Even as we “live by bread and basic science both,” it is
science to which human sapience “rises.” 4
In naturalized epistemology as Quine first styled it under that
name, we have the usually remarked elements of holism (the “web of
belief” vs. foundationalism), fallibilism (any of our previously credited
beliefs could be found in need of rejection or revision) and naturalism
(there is knowledge of the world only through its limited sensory
impacts on us, no knowledge a priori). These together disqualify an
indefeasibly privileged epistemic position that epistemology as an
normative tribunal of all knowledges would have to occupy. But there
is also the scientism, the vision of science as the mature culmination of
all natural knowledge, science as that knowledge in and of the world
than which there is not any better.5 This makes science the operative
normative tribunal for other kinds of knowledge of the world as well as
all of its own parts (but never, of course, all at once).6

II. The Science Question in Moral Epistemology
Quine’s founding discussion of naturalizing epistemology
suggests a certain prototype of that enterprise: a global scientifically
regimented holism and a particularly scientific naturalism. I argue now
that this is but one option, and not the best one, for naturalizing moral
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epistemology. Here is a generic prototype version (NE) of a broadly
“Quinean” argument for naturalizing the epistemology of scientific
knowledge. Without vexing the question about Quine’s views, I build
into this prototype the demand that epistemology have a normative
dimension. I build this in because I think even philosophers who place
themselves far distant from the search for foundations of knowledge
are nonetheless reasonably disinclined to view anything as an
epistemology that does not issue in at least, to use Hilary Kornblith’s
generous phrase, “constructive advice on the improvement of our
epistemic situation.”7 Of course, in a naturalized epistemology,
normative insight must be compatible with epistemology’s being a kind
of natural knowledge within the world, available through
uncontroversial human cognitive capacities; the normative dimension
must not interject itself from somewhere else, or enter through claims
to insight prior to or beyond all experience. A normative dimension
does not require that epistemology introduces some sui generis
constraints, values, or standards from somewhere outside actual
epistemic practices of several kinds. It might, for example, reflectively
retrieve standards immanent in epistemic practices and try to
understand relations of those standards to the practices themselves
and to other standards of those practices, as well as to standards of
other practices. I also use “real knowledge” as a dummy expression
for whatever conditions for beliefs’ being warranted one wants to plug
in.8 I am interested in exploring a structural parallel here, and I try to
leave this schematic prototype extremely general. This will allow us to
study some options for naturalizing moral epistemology in extremely
simplified and broad form, as well as to see where the “normative”
element reappears differently in the case of moral understanding.
(NE): The epistemology of science seeks to tell us under
what conditions we have real knowledge of the world.
So, epistemology must have a normative dimension, its
inquiries must distinguish conditions under which we are
likely to have genuine knowledge of the world from those
under which we have something else (belief that is not
warranted).
There is no kind of purely nonempirical knowledge that
could validate scientific knowledge.
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There is no empirical knowledge with validity superior to
scientific knowledge.
So, there is no kind of knowledge that does not include
scientific knowledge that can be used to establish the
validity of scientific knowledge.
So, the account of how we have real knowledge of the
world must itself become another application of science,
i.e. we will have to use (presumptively genuine but always
in principle fallible and revisable) scientific knowledge (our
best knowledge and its methods) to explain the conditions
under which we come to have such a thing as genuine
scientific knowledge.

Now let’s explore straightaway one direct extension of this
prototype for naturalizing epistemology in the case of moral knowledge
(NME1).
(NME1) The epistemology of moral knowledge tells us
under what conditions we have real knowledge of how we
ought to live.
Moral epistemology must have a normative dimension, its
inquiries must distinguish conditions under which we
have genuine knowledge of how we ought to live from
those under which we have something else (beliefs about
how to live that are not warranted).
Moral knowledge is one kind of knowledge about the
world (rather than about a transcendent or non-natural
realm).
Moral knowledge is knowledge about which
understandings of how to live are “valid”
(true/right/acceptable/deserving of authority).
So, there is no kind of purely nonempirical knowledge
that could validate moral knowledge.
There is no kind of empirical knowledge about the world,
including moral knowledge, with validity superior to
scientific knowledge.
There is no kind of knowledge outside of scientific
knowledge that can better be used to establish the
validity of moral knowledge.
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So, the account of how we have real knowledge of how we
ought to live becomes another application of science. I.e. we will use
some (presumptively genuine but always in principle fallible and
revisable) scientific knowledge (our best knowledge and its methods)
to explain how we come to have such a thing as genuine knowledge of
how we ought to live.
I have represented the matter of moral knowledge here under
the generic idea of “how we ought to live.” I assume this place holder
can accommodate views with deontological, consequentialist, virtue
and other elements, so long as these are views about how we ought to
live. I have for the purposes of this discussion assumed that people
express, defend, wonder and argue about, and teach their children
beliefs about how to live, and that the question about moral
knowledge involves asking whether such beliefs are or could be
warranted.9 I have included the “naturalistic premise” that moral
knowledge is a kind of knowledge about this, our actual, world.
Although a naturalist need not go in for naturalizing epistemology in
morals or elsewhere, it is hard to imagine anyone interested in
naturalizing moral epistemology not being some kind of naturalist
about morality. But the idea that moral knowledge is in and of the
world is meant in a fairly undemanding sense. It does not imply
narrower naturalist commitments about moral properties or facts; it
only suggests, on a parallel with NE above, that such knowledge as we
may have of how to live is gotten in the world by ordinary cognitive
capacities from our experiences of the world, which include our
experiences of living with others and thinking about how we and
others act and live.10 Finally, I leave open the characterization of the
validity of beliefs about how to live in order to leave open the
possibility that multiple ways in which to live might be “validated” by
inquiries into morality, and that there are different forms that this
“validation” might take. Again, I think this allows for the structural
parallel to emerge at a high level of generality.
This model raises a problem widely associated with scientifically
naturalized moral epistemology, the “loss of normativity.” Scientific
theories with explanatory power and predictive value may tell how
morality arises, is seated in our native capacities, and is transmitted in
communities with more or less continuity, without being able to say
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whether any extent forms of morality are morally better or worse than
others.11
Naturalized epistemology of science might at least plausibly
claim to have recaptured epistemology’s normative role from within
science, to the extent that sciences are successful practices of
knowledge of how the world in fact is in some respects. In their
respective domains with respect to the kinds of explanatory and
predictive powers for which we want that kind of knowledge, sciences
deliver what we want. We want to know how things work, in particular
how the structures of things explain how they work; where applicable,
we hope by knowing how things work to anticipate what they do, and
make them do what we want them to, and not what we don’t. Welldeveloped bodies of scientific theory deliver this, and deliver more of it
as they are extended and refined. Thus many of us are already as sure
as we can be (having given up on Cartesian certainty), that we have
some of what we want and it will pay to follow the patterns by which
we got it, at least if we want more of that. This is why, except to the
philosophical skeptic, proposing to vet claims to knowledge by appeal
to the ways we get such knowledge as science gives does not simply
jettison the pursuit of norms, but supposes that much of science as
practiced embodies the relevant norms. That is, the several sciences
embody such norms as conduce to obtaining the kinds of knowledge at
which they respectively aim. (And that the norms in play at any given
time are revisable does not mean that at any given time there are not
norms.)
The relevant norms for moral knowledge, however, would have
to be the ones owing to which moral knowledge delivers what is
wanted from it. We want moral knowledge in order to know how to
live. This is what beliefs embodied in actually practiced morality or the
simplified theoretical constructions of normative moral theory tell us:
the necessity, importance, or superior value of, for example, human
dignity, eternal salvation, the greatest happiness, harmony with
nature, the preservation of natural hierarchies, proper respect for
ancestors, nonviolence and universal compassion, or more or less
coherent combinations of these or others. If the going moral norms
(what we think we know morally, theoretically or on the hoof)
successfully produce what is wanted in their respective forms of life,
the question nonetheless remains open: is this a form of life we should
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want? This version of naturalized moral epistemology seems to have
no way to supply the kind of normativity involved in people’s living as
they really ought to live. And if moral inquiry in either its philosophical
or nonacademic versions is to retain its normative identity as an
inquiry into what is really right or good, into how human beings get
right how they ought to live rather than how they variously in fact do,
it seems that moral inquiry must be something other than a purely
scientific investigation.
This is not to deny that empirical findings of a scientific sort
might fulfill a part of the empirical burden of moral philosophy. Insofar
as moral epistemology needs, as it does, to understand what people
know in understanding how to live as they in fact do morally, to that
extent the parallel holds. Scientific studies of several types, for
example, might well help us understand how people come to master
the moral concepts in use, recognize the patterns of behavior their
extant morality requires or suppresses, and cultivate the perceptions
and feeling responses that enable people to bring expression and
action into morally appropriate play, both in fulfilling moral demands
or ideals as well as in understanding the terms of deserting or defying
them. A very important part of moral epistemology is the investigation
of the actual conditions of moral competence of various kinds.
Naturalized moral epistemology should be eager to reap the benefits of
whatever scientific studies of individual capacities or group processes
successfully explain how we are able to share a way of life and to learn
how to live within it (which does not always consist in living in
accordance with it).12 But this robustly empirical study, ripe with
potential for scientific contributions, leaves us one question short of
philosophical ethics. The missing question is: no matter how
successfully some group of people sustain a way of life they happen to
live, is the way they live how they ought to live? A naturalized moral
epistemology that has been absorbed into scientific studies might give
us the best accounts we can have of how they do it, without yet
touching in what sense they should.
Just here, though, there is more than one way to understand
the normativity problem. It might seem as if the kind of knowledge
that comes in with asking whether a given moral way of life is really
how to live cannot be any kind of empirical knowledge, and so must
either be knowledge of something nonempirical (“transcendent moral
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reality,” “non-natural properties”), or nonempirical knowledge of
something (“pure practical reason,” “the logic of moral language”). But
these moves to transcendence or to knowledge a priori throw in the
towel on naturalized epistemology for morality. Alternately, we might
hold that aside from what we know about how to get around in a “local
moral world,” there is no kind of moral knowledge left over to have.
This idea, however, can be taken in more than one way. It can be
taken to say that there is nothing that could be an answer to that
“normative question.”13 Or, on the contrary, it could be a starter for
naturalizing moral epistemology. There is no knowledge “over and
above,” but there are further uses of the same kinds of naturally
acquired moral knowledge we already have, together with whatever
else about the world we think we know, to assess our and others’
moral beliefs and our or others’ ways of arriving at them.
III. NATURALIZING MORAL KNOWLEDGE
In line with this idea, now try a different naturalizing model, one that
does not so much “extend” the naturalizing of science to ethics as take
up the structural analogy for ethics.
(NME2) The epistemology of moral knowledge tells us
under what conditions we have real knowledge of how
we ought to live.
Moral epistemology must have a normative dimension,
its inquiries must distinguish conditions under which we
have genuine knowledge of how we ought to live from
those under which we have something else (beliefs
about how to live that are not warranted).
Moral knowledge is one kind of knowledge about the
world (rather than about a transcendent or non-natural
realm).
So, there is no kind of purely nonempirical knowledge
that could validate moral knowledge.
Moral knowledge is knowledge about what
understandings of how to live are “valid”
(true/right/acceptable/deserving of authority.)
There is no kind of knowledge that can assess the moral
validity of a way of life that does not include moral
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knowledge, no knowledge of the validity of values that
does not include evaluative knowledge.
There is no kind of knowledge that without moral
knowledge can be used to establish the validity of moral
knowledge.
So, the account of how we have real knowledge of how
we ought to live becomes another application of moral
knowledge, i.e. we will use our best (presumptively
genuine but always in principle fallible and revisable)
moral and other knowledge of how to live to explain how
we can come to such a thing as knowledge of how to
live.

If we take seriously this approximation to a prototype for
naturalizing moral knowledge, other facets of naturalized moral
epistemology have to configure compatibly with it.
A naturalized moral epistemology will be holistic. But if we take
(NME2) seriously, we need to rethink what kind of holism about
knowledge it is plausible to endorse. “The” web of belief is a powerful
image that retains the pleasing picture of knowledge as all of one
piece, even as it jettisons the older architectural metaphor of a single
structure with fixed foundations. But what is the status of the idea that
knowledge is all of one piece? Surely an a priori conviction of the
necessity of the unity of knowledge does not comport with a
naturalized epistemology. Furthermore, (NME2) incorporates a
commitment to natural moral knowledge. But if moral knowledge
introduces a kind of normativity and forms of normative question open
to natural investigation that some other types of natural knowledge
cannot answer or explain, then it seems that moral knowledge (and
perhaps other types of evaluative, practical, and craft knowledge) is a
distinct type of knowledge, and we should not suppose that methods
of discovery or patterns of validation are simply identical to or
continuous with ones that obtain in other contexts. Finally, the image
of “science” is apt to play a mystifying role in these discussions: is
there a unified theoretical web of “science”? The “unity of science”
represents a regulative ideal invested with philosophical hopes (akin,
interestingly, to the reduction programs whose failure Quine remarks
in introducing of the idea of naturalizing epistemology), not the known
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reality of a web of seamlessly interconnected theory, or even methods
entirely homologous (much less uniform) in detail.
So it seems we have not enough reason to affirm a single web
of belief, and some reasons not to. I suggest that a naturalized moral
epistemology should opt for a contextual holism about knowledge.
Instead of the view that every belief in the web is linked by some
connections to all others, contextual holism would affirm only what we
know: every belief is linked in some network of beliefs to indefinitely
many others, including to normative standards that may be contextspecific.14 How and to what extent “webs” of belief overlap or
intermesh is itself open to inquiry. Whether the “web” idea with its
pleasing connotations of lithe transparency, springy flexibility, and
tensile strength is apt for imaging the organization of our knowledges
is to be explored. There is something after all very “unpragmatic,” in
its way, about Quine’s web: it pictures a tissue of belief holistically
hovering outside diverse action-repertoires, practices, relations,
techniques and institutions that are involved in making available and
vetting the status of beliefs. Open-ended contextual holism neither
seals “morality” and “science” off from each other as separate
language games nor preemptively unifies moral and scientific belief
into a single field.
Of course, one approach to naturalism in ethics tries to preserve
the autonomy of morality precisely by getting it out of the way of the
secure path of science, lest it be “secured” (as in (NME1)) by the
disappearance of ethics as a normative inquiry.15 This can be done by
making morality something natural that is other than knowledge. In
this category come noncognitivist and expressivist views. I sympathize
with this move in that I think it a distortion to picture morality as only,
essentially, or even primarily a matter of knowledge. This slights the
complex economy of feelings and the expressive and directive aspects
of our moral practice and discourse. But I consider ethics as pursuing
an understanding of morality, which provides understandings of
ourselves as bearers of responsibilities in the service of values.
STOPPED HERE
Instead, I reject two equations. One is the identification of Anatural@
or Aempirical@ knowledge exclusively with what can be known from
within the world about the ways the world in fact is. The other is the
equation of knowledge about how the world in fact is with scientific
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knowledge of the world. We sometimes know from within the world
how the world might or could be for us, that is, how the world could be
better or worse for us in some ways. Indeed, our knowing this is a
condition for our understanding many ideas basic to morality, such as
cruelty, suffering, and humiliation, or dignity, gratitude, and trust, and
for identifying the states and relations these ideas represent. It is also
true that much of our understanding of how the world in fact is and
could be is available not only through common sense knowledge, but
through refined and methodic inquiries that are not scientific, or are of
the more dubiously scientific sorts. Humanistic and critical disciplines,
like history, philosophy, critical social theory, historical and
critical studies of scientific practice, institutional genealogies,
literature, literary studies, cultural studies, and semiotics, as well as in
those scientifically lower-ranking social sciences and their still lower
ranking parts, such as social psychology, sociological theory,
ethnography, and their like, illuminate ways people live and how these
ways are understood by those who live them. In sum, for moral
knowledge and its improvement we must always use some of what we
know about the world, and some of what we know that bears most
crucially on moral knowledge and its refinement is not scientific
knowledge. For a suitably generous naturalism, we and our
experiences of the world and each other are in the world; how our
world is, could be, and would be better or worse are among the things
we can know from within our world about it.
In casting off global holism and scientifically regimented naturalism, I
have pulled out the main struts of a Ascientism@ that can prop up
some visions of naturalizing epistemology. Scientism is not (any)
science, but an ideological vision of the cultural role and human
significance of scientific knowledges. AScientism@ is a vision of a
mythicized entity Ascience@ as the ultimate source of valid answers to
anything worth knowing and the tribunal of what could possibly be
taken seriously as a question. Scientism is really a full blown
normative view; it is an ethics and a politics, not exclusively of
knowledge, but inevitably of culture, authority, and society. That,
however, is not something wrong with it. What=s wrong with it is its
spurious regimentation of scientific practices into mythic Ascience,@
and it=s a priori imposition of incontestable and preemptive closure on
our pursuits of understanding. What renders scientism ideological is its
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obscuring the variety, complexity, and fallibility of scientific practice,
its claiming strictly universal (and necessary?) dominion in the realm
of knowledge, and its borrowing the mantle of Ascientific objectivity@
when it is itself not science. Scientific inquiries
22
don=t need scientism. And naturalized epistemology should avoid the
embarrassing irony of putting Ascience@ in the place of an
incontestable and universal epistemic tribunal, which was exactly what
classical epistemology is usually understood to have hoped itself to be.
It will be necessary to repeat: I am not criticizing scientific inquiries or
saying that scientific method is an ideology. It is scientism, not
science, that has no place in a fallibilist and naturalized approach to
epistemology.
Freed from confining and reductive pictures of knowledge, it becomes
easier to acknowledge what is essential to a naturalist and naturalized
knowledge of morality. Moral knowledge needs all the reliable and
useful empirical information of any type that itBor rather weBcan get.
Part of the point of seeing morality naturalistically is to dig into the
idea that there is no prior restriction on what we could come to know
about ourselves in our world that might not have implications for our
beliefs about how to live. By the same token, moral knowledge is as
open-ended, revisable, and ultimately fallible as any other kinds of
natural knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, we use what we know, and
accept that we are likely at any time to be wrong about something.
And we must rest on some presumptive knowledge in order to
examine where knowledge itself comes from, while this very
examination may reveal that what we thought was knowledge was not
what it appeared. A naturalized epistemology needs to be freewheeling
and fallibilist, which is to say open to the best and most contextually
useful fruits of all inquiries and experiences. And the naturalized
epistemology of morality, in particular, seeks an understanding of
moral knowledge that is necessarily both epistemically and morally
reflexive.
IV. NORMATIVE QUESTIONS
What now of that Anormative question,@ not a question of simply
explaining the causes,
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organization, and effects of any individuals= or communities= moral
behavior, but a question of establishing whether we must or should do
what our going morality demands? This is a question about morality=s
authority, not merely its de facto power but its rightful dominion over
us. It is easy to start thinking that Athe normative question@ is one
big jackpot question about Aall@ morality that arises from some
reflective standpoint outside of or beyond morality. It can seem as if
this is a sort of super-question that requires a sort of super-answer,
that is, an answer to the question AIs it really right (obligatory, good,
etc.)?@ that is of a different order from answers to those garden
variety questions of Amust I really...?@ and Awould it really be wrong
to...?@ or Ahow much does it really matter if I...?@that arise about
different matters and at different levels of generality in people=s lives.
I suspect that the idea that there is a separate, external question
about morality=s authority is rooted deeply in non-naturalist, and
perhaps supernaturalist, thinking about morality that yearns for its
validation by something Ahigher,@ be that God, human nature, the
natural law, pure practical reason, or perhaps Ascience.@ Even
theories of ethics that understand it as a human construction, like a
procedure, or a contract, or a discursive situation, still often think that
the construction that could answer the normative question must be an
ideal construction. This is the idea that nothing any group of people is
doing at a place at a time isBindeed, could possibly beBour touchstone
in ethics when we ask whether a way to live really has authority.
But there cannot be just one normative question. For one has to stand
on some part of morality to pose a normative query about some other;
and there is always at least the possibility (although it is not
inevitable) that the moral judgment on which one stood for those
purposes at that time might come in question at some other. AThe@
normative question is not one question,
24
but a kind of question that recurs applied to different matters or
reapplied to earlier answers. And there is no way for it to be posed
Aoutside@ some moral assumptions or other.
The situation is no different for moral theorists. As naturalists, we do
not hesitate to look at the facts about the formation of moral beliefs.
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The fact is that what and how we can think about morality depends on
what we have learned in the context of our places within particular
ways of life, questions within them, and perhaps comparisons between
them and others ways more or less comparable. In fact, then,
Areflection,@ in moral philosophy or outside it, is on or of, or better
from, some bits of (putative) moral knowledge, some already familiar
forms of moral reasoning, some extant norms of responsibility, that
allow us to know that it is morality, what is right and good, that we are
thinking about here. Moreover, a large mass of critical work in late
twentieth century maps the deliverances of Areflection@ in moral
philosophy onto specific locations in a given social field: moral
theorizing Areflects@ characteristic roles, expectations, and lifeexperiences or the absence of experiences that track race, education,
national culture, religious heritage and practice, economic status,
gender, age, sexuality, physical ability and other factors that account
for different social worlds or very different experiences within the
same social world.16
16 See Walker, Moral Understandings, especially Chapter 1-3 for a
critique of epistemic placelessness and lack of reflexivity in moral
theorizing, as well as structural and historical analysis of the
emergence of the Atheoretical-juridical model@ of compact theory,
See also Chapters 1 and 3 for examination of the feminist critique of
gender and other bias in moral theorizing.
25
Better to recognize going in that actual moral ideas, practices, norms,
patterns of reasoning, and paradigmatic judgments are in fact always
in play in moral philosophy at the outset. The philosopher no more
asks after the moral authority of Amorality@ from outside of it than
does anyone reflecting on moral demands when the garden variety
questions work their way to the surface out of confusion, temptation,
longing, or ennui. The moral philosopher may be more relentless,
more systematic, and more logically acute in pursuing normative
questions. She may invent in thought startlingly simple or idealized or
schematic moral views the social realization of which may or may not
be determinate, available, or habitable in reality; this, too, may have
its uses. But in all cases of moral reflection, she starts where we all
do: we start from here, for some Awe,@ and some Ahere.@

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, (2000): pg. 75-101. Publisher link. This article is © Taylor & Francis and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Taylor & Francis.

15

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

In moral theorizing, as at other times, we resort in all cases to what
Christine Korsgaard calls Areflective endorsement.@17 If we are able
to endorse morality once we understand what about us and world,
especially our actual social world, grounds and enables the morality we
have, or if we can endorse a change based on the comparison between
what we have and what we might, based on these same
understandings, then this justifies the extant or revised morality=s
17 Korsgaard=s initially naturalistic treatment of Areflective
endorsement@ as the way to answer the normative question unfolds
into a argument for the universality and necessity of our valuing our
humanity as a condition for acting on reasons, hence bringing back in
a bit of the old apriori when it comes to securing morality. This view
makes for interesting comparison with the naturalized version of
reflective endorsement of actual ways of living. See Korsgaard, The
Sources of Normativity, Lectures 2 and 3.
26
authority, its Anormativity.@ Reflection can thus produce or sustain,
as it can defeat or chasten, confidence in the claims morality makes on
us. But we can only test our moral views by finding them good or not
upon reflective examination. So the normative question requires the
application of some morally normative standards or judgments in the
vetting of others.
What results when some of our moral practices, judgments, or
concepts pass moral review, is that our confidence in aspects of ways
we live is confirmed or perhaps enlivened; when they fail it is
weakened or destroyed. But it is not as if there are our moral beliefs
and our (always in part moral) reasons for them, and then there is our
Aconfidence@ in them, the way a cherry sits on a sundae.
AConfidence@ is not something we might have or not have about
those standards we hold as moral ones. When we hold some ways we
in fact live as Ahow to live,@ i.e. the right or better founded or more
enlightened ways, this way of holding certain standards marks them as
morally authoritative ones. When confidence wanes or is damaged, we
are inclined to wonder whether the standards we have held as moral
ones are in fact standards of some other kind (for example, etiquette
or mores) or whether we have held the wrong moral standards. So,
too, confidence does not replace knowing what is right or good; it is
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confidence in our knowing at least some of, or approximately, what is
right or good. Our standards and judgments (or some specially central
or important ones of them) being, literally for all we know, valid
constitutes the moral authority of morality, whatever other powers of
de facto social authority and inertial social practice hold the standards
and supporting practices in place.18
18 Compare Bernard Williams=s somewhat elusive appeals to
Aconfidence@ in Bernard Williams, Ethics and The Limits of
Philosophy, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
27
1985), 170-3. See also J. E. J. Altham, AReflection and confidence,@
in World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of
Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Williams, AReplies@ in the
same volume. While Williams seems to consider confidence an
alternative to knowledge, I see our confidence as a kind of trust in
what we know.
28
Naturalized epistemology of science needs to investigate beliefproducing cognitive, social, and institutional processes with an eye to
uncovering whether or not they are conducive to the kinds of truth the
sciences seek, and in doing so uses with confidence what it seems
most reasonable to think we already know.19 Moral epistemology,
whether practiced systematically by philosophers or in the event by
any thoughtful agent, needs to investigate belief-producing cognitive,
social, and institutional processes with an eye to uncovering whether
or not they are conducive to the kinds of worth upon which a moral
form of life rests its authority or in terms of which its authority is
understood. But Aworth@ here is a dummy expression for some form
of value or necessity that will not be identifiable independently of some
standards of moral judgment already in hand. Indeed, we can not so
much as characterize what our or someone else=s form of moral life is
without importing some understandings of what to identify as the
moral parts, and in what sort of evaluative language to identify them.
Wherever we invoke some moral concepts, standards, and judgments
to test whether some others Areally@ have the authority they purport,
the ones we invoke are invested with our confidence in their
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representing what we (already) reasonably understand to matter
morally. This does not prevent the very commitments in which we
have reposed confidence from becoming objects of critical reflection in
their turn.
An open-minded and empirically robust naturalism about morality
readily discovers that morality is not socially modular: moral
understandings are (indeed must be) effected through social
arrangements, while social arrangement include moral practices as
working parts. Our concepts and principles are given meaning by the
practices they in turn make sense of. For this
19 See Kornblith, AA Conservative Appproach to Social
Epistemology,@ 102ff.
29
reason there is not nor could there have been a Apure core@ of moral
knowledge completely extricable from some actual social world or
other.20 That is why moral knowledge requires extensive empirical
inquiry and intensive reflexivity about both the moral and non-moral
conditions under which we believe we know how to live.
A central mode of examination of our moral understandings is
Atransparency testing,@ which involves both moral and epistemic
aspects.21 We need to ask whether we in fact know how it is we do
live in our moral-social worlds. In fact, in most societies, Awe@ do not
all live the same lives, and Awe@ often fail to understand or do not try
to understand how the places our moral-social worlds provide for us
are the conditions for the very different places of others of us. Our
intermeshed moral and social understandings may be incomplete, selfserving, distorting, or rigged; they may render the lives of some of us
morally invisible, incoherent, or diminished. The moral values we
Ashare@ may be ones we do not equally freely endorse or enjoy. We
need to
20 See Walker, Moral Understandings, Chapters 2, 3, and 9 on the
genealogy and implications of the Apure core@ idea.
21 The idea of Atransparency@ as an ideal of moral views or social
orders appear in Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 101-10,
and Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, 17. Although she does not use
the phrase, I have profited most from Annette Baier=s application of
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what she calls a Aminimal condition of adequacy@ that a moral view
Anot have to condemn the conditions needed for its own thriving,@
that it not fail to acknowledge or deny acknowledgment to that which
is a condition of its working as it does. See Baier, Moral Prejudices, 96.
30
discover whether what are represented as morally authoritative
understandings are ones whose authority is or is not really earned by
their being shown answerable to well-founded fact and critically tested
moral standards. We need to explore whether practices that purport to
embody values, standards, and judgments Awe@ share and in which
Awe@ trust are really driven and reproduced by coercion, deception,
manipulation, or violence directed at some of us by others. Where
transparency testing of our actual lifeways does not sustain confidence
that Awe@ know either how we do live or how to live, the
understandings in play lose their moral authority. Then we really are
left with mere customs, habits, or mores; with ways some people in
fact live that are no longer credible as Ahow to live.@ But to discover
whether authority is warranted and confidence is in point, we must
bring to bear a lot of, and the most relevant and reliable, information
we have about morality and society. This is especially so in moral
theorizing and moral epistemology, where we are promised a high
degree of sophisticated scrutiny of the tenability of moral
conceptions.22
V. WHAT DO AWE@ KNOW BEST?
I have argued against a purely scientific naturalism, or a scientifically
insupportable Ascientism,@ lest we claim prematurely or irresponsibly
for scientific theories or findings a relevance to morality that they do
not have, or that we do not know they have. A different danger
22 The thorough intermeshing of moral and epistemic considerations
in the reciprocal relationship between understanding who we are, how
we live, and how to live, might be a very rich case of what Richmond
Campbell calls Afact-value holism.@ See Campbell, Illusions of
Paradox, Chapter 7.
31
for naturalists, and perhaps a greater, is that preoccupation with
science as our best empirical knowledge can turn our attention away
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, (2000): pg. 75-101. Publisher link. This article is © Taylor & Francis and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Taylor & Francis.

19

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

from other kinds of inquiry that bear deeply and directly on our
understandings of how we live and how to live. Between the Scylla of
scientific naturalism about morality, and the Charybdis of a
transcendent moral reality accessible to Apure@ reflection, lies a great
deal we can and already do know about our social worlds and moral
theories and traditions that is crucial for testing our moral
understandings. Above I mentioned humanistic disciplines, critical
studies, and the methodologically less rigorous parts of social and
political theory and sciences as important resources for moral
reflection, that is, for reflection on actual forms of life that claim moral
authority for those who live them (and perhaps beyond). Some
contemporary philosophical theorizing itself, empirically attentive and
reflexively critical about its empirical burdens and moral commitments,
offers moral reflection and moral theory materials it cannot honestly
proceed without.
I am going to use here, very briefly, a single example of such
empirically enriched but normatively motivated work that sharply
focuses a point about the kinds of things moral philosophy needs to
examine and who is likely to want to find them out. Charles W. Mills=s
The Racial Contract constructs a deliberately stylized theoretical model
to foreground both Athe most important political system of recent
global historyBthe system of domination by which white people have
historically ruled over and, in certain important ways, continue to rule
over nonwhite people;@ the invisibility of this system and the issues it
raises in mainstream ethics and political philosophy; the obscurity to,
or outright denial of, this system by most white people;
32
and the intimate relations among these.23 Specifically, Mills argues
that the tradition of social contract theory, still a hugely influential
tributary of modern Euro-American moral and political theory, cannot
be understood in its normative implications and historical reference
without seeing the broad and deep Racial ContractBa set of
interlocking political, moral, and epistemological assumptions and their
effectsBthat underwrites it.24 Mills, in effect, proposes that if
contractarian models are honored devices in philosophy for exposing
the logic of liberal political legitimacy, we ought to consider their
potential for diagnosing the logic of politically legitimated racism in
liberal polities. More broadly, Mills asks us to try examining the
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apparent contradiction of modern European moral philosophy as such:
A...an antipatriarchalist Enlightenment liberalism, with its
proclamations of equal rights, autonomy, and freedom of all
23 Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997), 1; hereafter cited as RC in the text.
24 Among the facets of the Racial Contract Mills connects with the
massive and grim historical record are: a Apartitioned social
ontology@ and juridical elaboration of persons and racial subpersons
(14); a racial polity that is obligated to the privilege of necessarily
white citizens at the expense of nonwhites (12); a racialized
geography that placed most human beings in a irremediable state of
nature (13), their lives uncounted (49-50) and their lands unpeopled
(49); an Aepistemology of ignorance@ that precludes understanding of
social and political realities (18), produces Amoral cognitive
distortions@ (95) and disqualifies cognition or cultural production of
non-Europeans (44).
33
men, thus took place simultaneously with the massacre, expropriation,
and subjection to hereditary slavery of men at least apparently
human@ (RC, 64).
In what he describes as a Anaturalized@ ethical account, Mills makes
use of the large and expanding body of historical, demographic,
anthropological, and critical studies of race, colonialism, modern
European history, economic development, and exploitation of nonEuropean lands and peoples. He also pays critical attention to aspects
of philosophy=s own history and to specific texts that have been
passed over silently or left out of sight in perpetuating a particular
version of a canonical history of philosophy. Mills=s project is not a
grand unified explanatory theory but a morally and epistemically
strategic intervention, a Arhetorical trope and theoretical method@
(RC, 6) for reorganizing perceptions of fact and by doing so posing
questions about what theories and professional discourses of moral
and political philosophy have seemed interested or uninterested in
knowing about our world. If one looks where he does determinedly
enough, it becomes a good deal harder to think, or not to think about,
some things. It becomes harder to think that Kant and other modern
European thinkers created visions of an ideal moral polity and merely
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, (2000): pg. 75-101. Publisher link. This article is © Taylor & Francis and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Taylor & Francis.

21

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

failed, due to lamentable but local prejudice, to imagine certain people
within it. Mills makes a compelling case by direct textual and inductive
historical evidence that it was integral to the construction of that ideal
polity that certain people be imagined outside it. One is dignified not
only by what one is, but by what, or rather whom, one is not.25
25 For a primer of short and disturbing selections that exhibit the
modern construction of race within Enlightenment terms by
Enlightenment thinkers, see Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed., Race and
the Enlightenment: A Reader (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers,
1997). Two
34
sobering historical studies that document the enormous energy and
evasion needed by Europeans to avoid the simplest path of taking
Africans or indigenous people as simply other human beings who lived
differently, even exotically differently, from Europeans are Olive
Dickason=s study of early North American colonization in the
Northeast, The Myth of the Savage: And the Beginnings of French
Colonialism in the Americas (Edmonton: The University of Alberta
Press, 1984, 1987), and Winthrop D. Jordan=s White Over Black:
American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1968).
35
An ostensibly Auniversalist@ tradition of ethical thinking about
Aman,@ Ahuman nature,@ and Ahumanity@ in Western philosophy,
from ancient to contemporary times, has in fact consistently been
understood and intended not to apply to the majority of humankind,
female and nonwhite. Yet is seems to depend on who moral theorists
are, and on to whom they give their accounts and are accountable,
whether they will question the significance of this. The ostensible
universalism of most contemporary moral philosophy and the
bowdlerized universalist presentation of its history conceals the actual
history in which the enunciation of Auniversal@ truths has not only
coexisted with but has served persisting social practices of dividing,
excluding, stratifying, subordinating, degrading, and dehumanizing the
larger part of humankind. Most moral philosophers continue to import
assumptions about the uniformity of moral intuitions, standard
conditions of responsibility, or the universal recognizability of
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Acommon humanity,@ in a way that disguises the ways moral
perceptions are characteristically formed in societies in which social
and moral differentiation is nearly universally the rule.26 Do we know
26 The importance for moral philosophy of recognizing, not ignoring or
obscuring, the pervasive fact of differentiated social-moral positions in
human societies is a main theme of Moral Understandings. I have
elsewhere examined several philosophers= arguments that
presuppose, while purporting to prove, that recognizing the Acommon
humanity@ of other human beings is in some sense unavoidable.
Sadly, it has been and continues to be avoided in numerous forms
more often than not by human beings. See Margaret Urban Walker,
AIneluctable Feelings and Moral Recognition,@ in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, Volume XXII: The Philosophy of Emotions, ed. Peter A.
French and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre
36
whether our systems of moral philosophy even now are free of
conceptual features or substantive assumptions that continue the
actual tradition and the understandings it has in fact required? Do we
routinely and methodically make sure that we use what we know to
find out? Do Awe@ really know more about the evolution of social
cooperation than about recent histories and ongoing dynamics of social
subordination or imperialism? Or do these questions not seem
important enough, or philosophical enough, for Aus@ to address? It
depends on who we are.
In fact, it is overwhelmingly women who have explored the sexism of
ethical theory; people of color, ethnically marginalized people, or
indigenous people who have insisted that we know about racism or
colonialism; gay, lesbian, and transsexual theorists who ask us review
the moral intuitions of a hetero-normative cultural universe critically.
Not all of Aus@ know what others do, and not all of us try to, or care
to.
Louise Antony says naturalizing knowledge Arequires us to give up the
idea that our own epistemic practice is transparent to us...@27 So too
for our moral practice, and the epistemic practice, moral philosophy,
that seeks to know it, from within it. In moral epistemology, we cannot
but ask ourselves what we know best about science, morality, and
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social life, and how we know it. Yet here it is epistemically and morally
urgent that we open the question that Moore
Dame Press, 1998).
27 Louise M. Antony, AQuine as Feminist,@ in A Mind of One=s Own:
Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, ed. Louise M. Antony and
Charlotte Witt (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 202.
37
would never have asked: who are Awe@? And how, in point of fact, do
we know that?28
28 I thank John Greco, Richmond Campbell, and Bruce Hunter for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft. An opportunity to present a
shorter version of this paper in a symposium on naturalized moral
epistemology at the Canadian Philosophical Association in Edmonton,
May, 2000, helped me to rethink the final form of this essay. I thank
the CPA for this invitation.

Endnotes
1. My view is developed in Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Understandings: A
Feminist Study in Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1998).
2. W. V. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Ontological Relativity and
Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), hereafter cited as
EN in the text.
3. Richmond Campbell claims that Quine views science as “free of” the effect
of value judgments, but acknowledges that Quine in at least one context
speaks of empiricism as a theory of evidence that “has both a descriptive and
a normative aspect” (“On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma” in Theories and
Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 39, and 41 on
the “empiricist discipline” that makes for “more or less responsible science”).
See Richmond Campbell, Illusions of Paradox (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 1998), Chapter 5. A useful discussion that rejects the
“no normativity” view, but recognizes ambiguity in Quine’s position about
normativity is Richard Foley, “Quine and Naturalized Epistemology,” in
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume XIX: Philosophical Naturalism, ed.
Peter A. French, Theordore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). Certainly for Quine it is
no business of science to judge how the world ought to be, but this is not the
same as judging what science ought to do in constructing and revising its
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picture of the world. And Quine invokes predictive success, conservatism in
accommodating recalcitrant experiences, and simplicity of laws, as
considerations in revising our web of belief (see, for example, W. V. Quine,
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” The Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 20-43).
Quine seems to like to label these appeals “tendencies” and “inclinations,” but
this doesn’t disguise the fact that they are normative, i.e. parts of the
practice of doing good science. See, finally, Quine’s later discussion in Pursuit
of Truth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Revised Edition, 1992),
Chapter 1, 19-21, which calls naturalized epistemology a “chapter of
engineering: the technology of anticipating sensory stimulation” (19)
concerned with heuristics, with “the whole strategy of rational conjecture in
the framing of scientific hypotheses” (20). Here Quine considers the
constraint of predictive power not normative but constitutive of a “languagegame” of science. These later views are in some respects more congenial to
my own picture of naturalizing moral epistemology; but I believe it is Quine’s
earlier views that have set the tone for dominant conceptions of what
“naturalizing” is.
4. W. V. Quine, “Natural Kinds,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 138. See also “Five Milestones
of Empiricism,” in Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1981), 72. Peter Hylton makes a good case that Quine’s naturalism can
go so far as to reject empiricism if science, improbably, validated nonsensory
forms of knowledge like telepathy and clairvoyance (the examples are Quine’s
own). See Peter Hylton, “Quine’s Naturalism,” in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, Volume XIX: Philosophical Naturalism, ed. Peter A. French,
Theordore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
5. Lorraine Code presents a detailed diagnosis and critique of the tendentious
and unsupported assumptions about science, scientific psychology, and
nature that structure Quinean naturalized epistemology. Although she does
not discuss naturalized moral epistemology, her critique powerfully exposes
the non-scientific ethos of scientism at several levels. See “What is Natural
About Epistemology Naturalized?” American Philosophical Quarterly 33
(1996): 1-22. See also, Tom Sorrell, Scientism: Philosophy and the
Infatuation with Science (London: Routledge, 1991), cited by Code.
6. Quine’s own meager views on ethics confirm that science will be judge of
ethics, at least: ethics is “methodologically infirm,” because “lacking in
empirical checkpoints” for those ends that cannot be shown instrumental
(Quine says “causally reduced”) to others. Our moral judgments, as also our
propensity to extrapolate from some applications of ethical standards to
others, can only answer back to our “unsettled” moral standards themselves,
so “coherence” only and “no comparable claim to objectivity” is the lot of
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ethics. See “On the Nature of Moral Values,” in Theories and Things
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 63-65. Below I return to
the idea that moral standards answer back to moral standards, although also
to the experience of the world of those who live in social worlds in which
these standards have authority.
7. Hilary Kornblith, “A Conservative Approach to Social Epistemology,” in
Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, ed. Frederick
F. Schmitt (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), 96.
8. I’m using “warranted belief” here in the fairly open sense that Michael
DePaul does as “meeting standards that identify what would be epistemically
good, excellent, or best.” See Michael DePaul, Balance and Refinement (New
York: Routledge, 1993), 74.
9. I like to think that this model could be adapted to characterize the
justification of certain moral sensibilities, attitudes, or endorsings of norms if
moral judgments are explained as expressive rather than descriptive, but I do
not attempt to show this here. See Alan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings:
A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1990) and Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical
Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) for expressivist views.
10. I neither affirm nor deny “a” or “the” fact/value distinction, being
uncertain what it means but certain that it means different things to different
people. I consider ethical propositions bona fide propositions; but ethical
propositions have distinctive and, I believe, multiple roles to play within
practices of responsibility structuring social life. These roles include
descriptive, expressive, directive, and perhaps other aspects.
11. The empirical-scientific study of morality is a not, of course, a “value-free”
enterprise. Few today will deny that scientific knowledge is imbued with
epistemic norms, if not other kinds. Feminist epistemology has produced the
most sustained contemporary philosophical defense (in varied forms) of the
claim that scientific knowledge is also inescapably constrained or driven either
by non-epistemic (for example, social, moral, and political) norms. For two
good samplers, see Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, eds., Feminist
Epistemologies (New York: Routledge, 1993) and Louise Antony and Charlotte
Witt, eds., A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993). Some classics are: Lorraine Code,
What Can She Know? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Sandra
Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986); Helen E. Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990); Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Who Knows? (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1990); Donna Haraway, Simian, Cyborgs, and
Women (New York: Routledge, 1991) Naomi Scheman, Engenderings (New
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York: Routledge, 1993). See also Richmond Campbell, Illusions of Paradox
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998) for a recent
defense of feminist empiricism.
12. One collection that takes up a variety of issues surrounding the meanings
of naturalism and the relevance of empirical studies to moral philosophy is
Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, and Andy Clark, eds., Mind and Morals: Essays
on Ethics and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).
13. The phrase “the normative question” is the centerpiece of Christine
Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
14. Wittgenstein’s fitful but insightful treatment of the grammar of knowledge
is one standard locus for this view in On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe
and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, (New York:
Harper & Row, 1972). See also Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts:
Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil
Blackwell, 1991), which rejects a global view of knowledge.
15. See Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, Peter Railton, AToward Fin de siècle
Ethics: Some Trends,@ Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 115-89 for an
anatomy of some contemporary metaethics organized by the issue of
“placing” ethics with respect to “empirical science as the paradigm of
synthetic knowledge.” (The authors attribute the terminology of placing to
Simon Blackburn.) In a footnote, they demur from the view that “objective
knowledge” has a definite meaning and deny that it amounts to “knowledge
as attained in the empirical sciences,” leaving room for alternative
conceptions of objectivity, as well as the corrective impact of an alternative
conception of ethical objectivity upon understanding of objectivity in
mathematics and science (see page 126, note 29). But the authors=
admonitory remark that “Such ‘placement’ would enable us to see how much
of morality remains in order” shows their own investment in the tribunal of
science. In contrast, see John McDowell’s “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” which
chastises “neo-Humean naturalism” in favor of a reality that encompasses our
“second,” moral natures, in Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral
Theory, ed. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). But see also essays on Humean
epistemology and naturalism in Annette Baier’s Moral Prejudices: Essays on
Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). There are varied
alternatives to scientific naturalism, not all mutually compatible.
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